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Abstract: The analysis of digital activism has so far been dominated by a techno-determinist 
approach which views the content of various forms of activism supported by digital 
communication, as directly reflecting the properties of the technologies utilised by activists 
and the historical evolution of such technologies. This line of interpretation has been 
manifested in the popularity acquired by notions as “Twitter protest” or “revolution 2.0” in the 
news media and in academic discourse in reference to recent protests. Moving beyond this 
reductionist trend, this article proposes an ideological approach to the study of digital 
activism and its historical transformation, which may better account for the combination of 
political, cultural and social factors involved in shaping it. I identity two main waves of digital 
activism, which correspond not only to two phases of technological development of the 
Internet (the so-called web 1.0 and web 2.0), but also to two different protest waves, the anti-
globalisation movement, and the movement of the squares that began in 2011, each with its 
own dominant ideology. I argue that reflecting the seismic shift in perceptions and attitudes 
produced by the 2008 financial crash, and the connected shifts in social movement ideology, 
digital activism has moved from the margins to the centre of the political arena, from a 
countercultural posture to a counterhegemonic ambition. I describe this turn as a transition 
from cyber-autonomism to cyber-populism as the two defining techno-political orientations of 
the first and second wave of digital activism. Reflecting the influence of neo-anarchism and 
autonomism in the anti-globalisation movement cyber-autonomism viewed the Internet as an 
autonomous space where to construct a countercultural politics outside the mainstream. To 
the contrary, informed by the populist turn taken by 2011 and post-2011 movements cyber-
populism approaches the Internet as a “popular space”, a generic space which is populated 
by ordinary citizens, and mostly dedicated to non-political activities, such as gossip, celebrity 
culture, or interpersonal communication, but which can nevertheless be politicised, and 
turned towards the purpose of popular mobilisation against the neoliberal elites responsible 
for economic and social disarray. This shift which substantially modifies the way in which 
activists conceives of and utilise digital media goes a long way towards explaining the 
differences in digital activism practices, and their contrasting views of the Internet as a tool 
and site of struggle.  
Keywords: Digital activism, ideology, social media, populism, autonomism, Internet, 
counterculture, popular culture, techno-politics, techno-determinism
1. Introduction 
Digital activism, a term widely used to describe different forms of activism that utilise 
digital technology, has undergone a rapid transformation since its emergence at the 
dawn of the web. From the vantage-point of the mid 2010s it is possible to tentatively 
identify two main waves of digital activism. The first corresponds to the early 
popularization of the Internet and the rise of the web in the mid ‘90s which was 
accompanied by the development by a first wave of digital activism. This wave 
encompassed a number of projects and initiatives waged by tech and alternative 
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media activists of the anti-globalisation movement, including the alternative news site 
Indymedia, as well as a number of alternative mailing lists and early hacker (or 
hacktivist) groups and labs. The second wave coincides with the rise of the so-called 
web 2.0 Internet of social networking sites such as Facebook, YouTube and Twitter, 
which has been accompanied by the rise of world-famous hacker collectives as 
Anonymous and Lulzsec, as well as the “social media activism” of 15-M, Occupy and 
the other movements of the squares, whose organisers have used social networking 
sites as platforms of mass mobilisation. To what extent are these two phases of 
digital activism simply a reflection of the evolution of digital technology, and of the 
shift from web 1.0 to web 2.0, as they are often portrayed? Is the difference between 
them to be understood merely as deriving from the changing material affordances of 
digital technology at a time of rapid technological innovation? Or is there something 
more to the equation?    
The debate about the transformation of digital activism has so far tended to follow 
a typical techno-deterministic tendency which reads technology as the ultimate cause 
of social transformation. This conception is belied by the popularity acquired by terms 
as “revolution 2.0” (Ghonim 2012), “wiki-revolution” (Ferron and Massa 2011) or 
“Twitter revolution” (Morozov 2009), widely used in news media and scholarly 
accounts to refer to recent protest movements making use of digital technology. The 
underlying rationale of these expressions is that the adoption of a certain kind of 
platform, say Facebook or Twitter, automatically defines the form of activism 
channelled through it. This approach stems from a simplistic view of technology’s 
effects, deeply informed by the media theory of McLuhan and his famous moniker 
“the medium is the message” (1967; 2011), according to which the use of a given 
technological device results in a series of inevitable consequences. The school of 
media ecology, deeply informed by McLuhan’s work has important things to say 
about the way in which technology structures action, for example the way in which 
different communication technologies (say telephone, TV or the Internet), carry with 
them different communication architectures (one-to-one, one-to-many, many-to-
many), and different dispositions from the users of technology (Postman 1985; 
Lundby 2009). However, it tends to neglect a number of non-technological factors – 
socio-economic, political and cultural ones – that intervene in defining activism’s 
content. To go beyond such simplified view of technology as an un-mediated force 
reshaping organisational structures and protest practices after its own image, the 
analysis of digital activism needs to recuperate an understanding of ideology, 
understood as a worldview and value system which shapes collective action, and of 
how ideology interacts with technology in shaping activist practices.    
Adopting this approach, in this article I develop a periodisation of digital activism 
which centres around two different waves, each with its own ideological 
characteristics and with its accompanying “techno-political” orientations, to use the 
term introduced by Rodotà to describe the nexus between politics and technology 
and since widely adopted by activists and researchers. To this end I draw from my 
previous theorising on digital activism (Gerbaudo 2012; 2016) in the movement of the 
squares of 2011 and other post-2011 movements.  
My argument can be schematically summarised as follows. Anti-globalisation 
activists adopted a techno-political approach that I describe as cyber-autonomist. 
This approach was deeply informed by the 70s and 80s counter-culture, DIY culture, 
and the tradition of alternative media, from pirate radios to fanzines. These different 
inspirations shared an emphasis on the struggle for the liberation of individuals and 
local communities from the interference of large-scale institution. Drawing on these 
antecedents, cyber-autonomism approached the Internet as a space of autonomy. 
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The movement of the squares has instead adopted what I describe as a cyber-
populist attitude which sees the Internet as a space of mass mobilisation in which 
atomized individuals can be fused together in an inclusive and syncretic subjectivity. 
This approach reflects the populist turn that has marked the movement of the 
squares, as seen in its adoption of a discourse of the people, or of the 99% against 
the elites (Gerbaudo 2017).   
These two techno-political orientations evidently reflect the process of 
technological evolution from the more elitist web 1.0 to the massified web 2.0 of 
social network sites. But their understanding cannot be reduced to this technological 
transformation. It also needs to encompass a plurality of other factors, and account 
for the seismic shift in attitudes and perceptions caused by the financial crisis of 2008 
and connected ideological developments. Paralleling the turn of social movements 
from anarcho-autonomism to populism as the dominant contestational ideology, 
digital activism has transitioned from a view of the Internet as a space of resistance 
and counter-cultural contestation, to its understanding as a space of counter-
hegemonic mobilisation.   
The article begins with a theoretical discussion of different factors involved in the 
transformation of digital activism, and in particular the relationship between 
technology, politics and culture. I highlight the need to give more attention to political, 
cultural and ideological factors in the understanding of digital activism beyond the 
techno-determinism that currently dominates the literature. I continue by 
demonstrating how ideological shifts have shaped the transformation of digital 
activism, by exploring the transition from cyber-autonomism to cyber-populism, and 
how it manifests itself in a number of concrete examples. I conclude with some 
reflections on the implications for future research about digital activism, emphasising 
the need to bring ideology back into the analysis of protest movements of the digital 
era. 
2. Techno-politics Beyond Techno-Determinism 
Digital activism is a form of activism that by definition brings into question the 
relationship between politics and technology, or to use a term that has become en 
vogue among activists and researchers in recent years, the nature and dynamics of 
“techno-politics”. Techno-politics is a term that has been coined by Italian politician 
and scholar Stefano Rodotà (1997) to express the nexus between politics and 
technology, and has since been popularised by activist scholars as Javier Toret 
(2013) in Spain to define the new field of analysis raised by the development of 
digital activism. Referring to the two constitutive concepts in the notion of techno-
politics - technology and politics - one can argue that up to this point the scholarship 
on digital activism has excessively focused on the first element while neglecting the 
second. Scholars have tended to read political transformation as resulting from 
technological transformation, thus overlooking that also the converse is the case, 
namely that changes in political and ideological orientations modify the way 
technology is conceived of and used.      
The techno-deterministic nature of much contemporary scholarship on digital 
activism is seen in the way in which the nature of digital activism is understood as 
deriving directly from specific properties of technology. This is clearly seen in the 
debate about the effects of media affordances on digital activism. An example, is the 
book by Earl and Kimport (2011) and the way it approaches digital media as a set of 
apparatuses that lower costs to participation and thus facilitate new forms of 
interaction that were previously impossible. In line with much literature coming from a 
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political science perspective, this account proposes an instrumental and economic 
understanding of media effects, as seen in the language of “benefits” and “costs” 
which it utilises to explain the use of digital technology. This approach explains the 
practical advantages of digital technology to activists but it neglects the symbolic and 
cultural dimension of digital activism starting from the actual content that is 
channelled through this technology. A similar critique can be made to the work of 
Lance W. Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg, and their theory of what they describe 
as “connective action” (2012) in opposition to the notion of collective action. Bennett 
and Segerberg claim that social media with their allowing for increased connectivity, 
overcome the collective logic of earlier social movements, and their need for 
leadership and collective identity (2012). Thanks to digital technology movements 
can thus become more personalised and less controlled from organisational centres. 
What is overlooked in this context, is that this libertarian application of digital 
technology is far from being an inevitable result. The affordances of digital 
technology can be turned towards very different political ends and coupled with very 
different organisational formats. It is sufficient to think for example about the fact that 
radically different political phenomena as the Occupy Wall Street movement and 
Donald Trump campaign in the 2016 presidential elections have both proficiently 
used social media, yet in radically different ways, and on the back of radically 
different organisational structures.  
A techno-deterministic element is arguably also present in the work of Manuel 
Castells on digital activism. To be fair, Castells’ account is far more nuanced than 
purely structuralist accounts originating mostly from the field of political science. This 
is because Castells works in the sociological tradition and his approach also 
accounts for a number of cultural factors that are involved in shaping the Internet and 
digital activism. Differently from other authors he does not see technology as an 
almighty monolith but also as a social and cultural product. In this light, Castells has 
interestingly argued that an important factor to understand digital culture is the 
influence of the libertarian spirit of the 1960s and 1970s protest movements and the 
way it has inspired the de-centralised end-to-end architecture of the Internet (2004). 
Nevertheless, Castells’ theory of the network society, and his view of digital 
technology as ushering in a shift away from the pyramidal structure of Fordist society, 
and towards network-like structures proper to the information society still contains 
some techno-deterministic elements. This is due to the view of technology as 
ushering what he describes as a “morphological” transformation that affects the 
entirety of society, and that has consequences on all social fields and organisations 
that adopt digital technology. This view no doubt contains an element of truth, but it 
seems to neglect the flexibility that such process of organisational influence usually 
manifests. Furthermore, it is wrong in assuming that digital technology tends to bring 
about an erosion of hierarchy. As I have demonstrated in my previous work, digital 
activism is not an horizontal and leaderless space, but is accompanied by the rise of 
new forms of leadership (2012; 2016).    
A similar tendency is also seen in Castells’ work on social media. Castells has 
argued that the diffusion of social media as Facebook and Twitter has transformed 
internet communication and introduce a new media logic which he describes as 
“mass self-communication” (2009), one which combines the logic of self-
communication of face-to-face, telephone and other one-to-one media, with the mass 
and one-to-many of mass media. According to Castells this communication logic 
deeply informed the 2011 movements of the Indignados, Occupy and the Arab 
Spring, and it strongly contributed to their mass outreach (2012). This view certainly 
provides with a powerful rationale to understand the way in which the second wave of 
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digital activism has managed to go beyond the minoritarian politics of the first wave. 
According to it, social media have provided the necessary technical conditions for 
new forms of digital activism to arise. However, Castells tends to neglect how in this 
shift also ideological and political factors have concurred. As I will demonstrate in the 
course of the article, without a change in ideology the new opportunities of mass 
mobilisation offered by social media would have not been reaped by protest 
movements.   
The work of Jeffrey Juris, an anthropologist and a former student of Manuel 
Castells has followed a similar line of reasoning, reading the transformation of 
activism as resulting from technological transformation. In his influential book 
Networking Futures (2008) Juris argued that the anti-globalisation movement was 
informed by the imaginary of the network which constituted a key inspiration in a 
number of digital activism projects that emerged around this time, including the 
alternative news site Indymedia, and alternative mailing lists used by activists to 
organised specific activities and campaigns. In his work about the movement of the 
squares of 2011, Juris has argued that this wave has a different logic to the anti-
globalisation one. He discusses a shift from the logic of networking of anti-
globalisation activists, to what he describes as a “logic of aggregation”, and argues 
that this transformation derives from the evolution from the web 1.0 to the web 2.0 
and that the logic of aggregation reflects the new mass outreach affordances of 
social media platforms. This logic has been supported by the “virality”, that is by the 
capacity for rapid diffusion afforded by corporate social networking sites as Facebook 
and Twitter, and has then been translated physically in the occupied squares of 2011 
teeming with large crowds (2012). Juris’ inspiring analysis provides some interesting 
insights about the technological underpinnings of the transformation of protest 
tactics. Yet, it overlooks how this change in the way of doing protest is also informed 
by significant changes in protest culture and ideology.  
2.1. Bringing Protest Culture Back into the Equation  
While these accounts are right in identifying the influence played by technology on 
contemporary politics, they often tend to adopt a reductive understanding of this 
relationship of causation. A certain type of technological arrangement is seen as 
automatically leading to a certain logic of action, with little attention paid to the 
process of political or cultural mediation that intervene in different concrete examples 
of digital activism. Indeed, digital activism is not just a technical phenomenon, it is a 
phenomenon. It is an activity that revolves around communicating certain messages, 
ideas, images, and therefore it possesses not only a technological but also a cultural 
dimension. The cultural, as well as more generally the political, nature of digital 
activism needs to be taken into account if we are to understand why digital activism 
has developed in certain way and why it has changed through time. To overcome the 
techno-deterministic bias of contemporary debates it is necessary to pay attention to 
the complex imbrication between politics, culture and technology, with specific 
reference to a) the relative autonomy of politics from technology; b) the symbolic and 
not only material character of technological processes; c) the role of technology as a 
mediator of social relationships and ways of life that cannot be reduced to technology 
alone.  
First, a key problem in techno-deterministic accounts is the way in which 
technology is seen as the independent variable always bound to determine the logic 
of action of social movements and consequently steer in a certain direction. This 
approach neglects what we could described as the “relative autonomy of political and 
cultural processes from technology” that is the way in which culture and politics are 
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influenced by but not reducible to technology. Technology does not single-handedly 
define activism, rather activism is always informed by the cultural contents it 
channels, by the ideas, images, views that it puts forward. A number of recent works 
illustrate this point.  
Wolfson in his book CyberLeft looking at the anti-globalisation movement and its 
use digital media, highlights how digital media practices are accompanied by a 
certain ethos and “cultural logic”, which approaches the Internet not just as a tool but 
also a space of solidarity in which different struggles can unite (2014, 17). Similarly 
Barassi and Treré have argued that besides the evolution of technology it is 
important to take into account the lived experience of the activists who utilize that 
technology, and the way they deconstruct assumptions about the nature and purpose 
of technology (2012). Coleman has argued that hacking is not just a technical 
practice but also a social one which carries specific ethics and aesthetics, aspects 
which are influenced by, but cannot be reduced to technology (2013). This is seen in 
the way in which hacker groups construct their own language and symbology, 
epitomised by the mask of Anonymous, taken from the cult movie V for Vendetta. 
Thus, it is necessary to pay attention not only to the technical devices used by 
activists, but also by the cultural contents they channel through such technologies.  
Second, it is important to account for the fact that technology is not just a material 
apparatus, a technical or instrumental structure possessing certain properties, but 
also a symbolic object to which a number of meanings and cultural uses are 
attached. This is an aspect that has been widely documented in the literature on the 
domestication of media and technology (Berker, Hartmann and Punie 2005) and in 
the cultural study of science and technology (Menser and Aronowitz 1996; Van Loon 
2002). Scholars have shown that technologies can be associated with very different 
meanings depending on the different social and cultural contexts in which they are 
deployed and the values and beliefs of the groups that utilise them. As Kavada has 
demonstrated, not only does digital activism reflect the properties of the Internet as a 
set of technical devices, but also of the internet cultures that have emerged within it, 
such as hacker culture (2013). The Internet is not just a technology but also a cultural 
space, the two being difficult to separate from one another. This aspect calls for the 
need to explore the role played by various internet cultures and subcultures in 
influencing digital activism.  
Third, we should avoid looking at technology instrumentally, as a self-standing tool 
but appreciate the way in which technology mediates social relationships, since this 
is ultimately the most important way in which technology has an effect on social 
phenomena. This view is ultimately the one which lied at the core of Marx and Engels 
account of industrial technology. For them what mattered was not just the way in 
which it allowed for new forms of production, but also the fact that it materialised a 
relationship of oppression, in their case the one of the bourgeoisie over the 
proletariat (2002 [1848]). Techno-deterministic analysis tends to bracket this aspect, 
overlooking the fact that technology is a mediator of a certain social relationship be it 
of oppression, leadership or cooperation. Furthermore, it overlooks the way in which 
technology is embedded in broader social (and not just communication) ecologies 
and the social relationships that are established within them.  
Lim has for example demonstrated how the effectiveness of social media in 
circulating information relevant to the protest movements that eventually led to the 
Tahrir protests in 2011, was the presence of thick offline social networks. These were 
exemplified by the way in which cab drivers in Cairo facilitated the circulation of 
information via word-of-mouth, repeating to others what they had heard from 
passengers about “what Facebook was saying” on any given day (2012). The effects 
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of technology thus depend not just on its affordances but also on the social 
relationships and ways of life with which it is entangled. This aspect highlights the 
need to appreciate the embeddedness of technology in different cultural 
communities, and the way in which technological use depends on the customs, 
values and norms adopted by these communities.   
These different critiques call for a more nuanced account of the relationship 
between technology and politics, which may render not just how technology 
influences politics, but also how in turn politics influences technology. In my 
contention, the way to achieve this objective is to resurrect the notion of ideology, 
hereby understood in the neutral sense as a system of values and beliefs adopted by 
political and social actors and allowing them to act as a collective. Ideology is a term 
that provides a way to explore the complex imbrication of cultural, political and social 
factors which alongside technology influence the way in which digital activism is 
performed.  
A number of scholars have already begun to explore how different technological 
practices carry their own ideologies. For example, Turner has argued that the 
development of cyberculture was informed by the ideology of techno-utopianism and 
techno-libertarianism, which was in turn informed by the 70s and 80s counterculture, 
with their emphasis on individual self-realisation and their suspicion for large-scale 
institutions (2010). Barbrook and Cameron argued that the rise of the digital economy 
in the 1990s manifested an inchoate ideology they described as the Californian 
ideology: a techno-libertarian worldview bringing together hippies and yuppies 
(1995). An ideological element is also clearly visible in social media. Social media are 
in fact not just a set of applications with given material affordances. Alike other 
media, they also carry their own media ideologies (Gershon 2010), or in this case 
what we could described as “the ideology of social media” manifested for example in 
the language, of sharing, crowd-sourcing, friendship and collaboration they have 
introduced (see for example Fuchs 2013, 98; Lovink 2011; Van Dijck 2014, 172). 
Building on this literature about the nexus between technology and ideology in the 
continuation of this article I develop a periodisation of digital activism in two waves 
with distinct ideological characteristics, and connected “techno-political orientations”, 
that is different ideologically informed ways of conceiving of the relationship between 
politics and technology.  
3. 1990s-2010s: Digital Activism from Counterculture to Counterhegemony 
Looking at the transformation of digital activism through the lens of ideology, allows 
to appreciate the way in which political and cultural factors combine with 
technological ones in shaping the content of various forms of activism channelled via 
social media. Being a form of activism that is deeply entangled with technology, 
digital activism reflects the nature and transformation of the ecosystem of digital 
communication (Treré 2012). However, this technological influence is “filtered” 
through a number of political and cultural factors, and more specifically “techno-
political orientations” that determine how a certain technology is conceived of and 
utilised. This conception of technology that I describe through the term techno-
political orientation is highly ideological in character since it involves a value-laden 
view of the Internet and of its role in society and politics, and ideological are its 
consequences, in the way in which it guides collective action. 
Following this line of thinking we need to explore how processes of evolution of 
digital activism that are usually understood as stemming simply from the evolution of 
technology do in fact also reflect a change in the ideology of protest movements and 
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in their techno-political stance. This is most clearly seen in the view of an activism 1.0 
followed by activism 2.0, as paralleling the transition from web 1.0 to web 2.0 and 
reflecting the change in technology and affordances. It is obvious that there is some 
truth to this parallel. However, as I will endeavour to demonstrate the causes of this 
transformation are more complex and cannot be reduced to technological factors 
alone. In fact, these two waves of digital activism do not only coincide with two waves 
of technological evolution, but also to two phases of social movement mobilisation 
each with its own defining characteristics.  
These two protest phases are the anti-globalisation movement around the turn of 
the millennium and the movement of the squares of 2011. These two protest 
movements have shared many similarities, to the point that some activists have seen 
the second wave to be a continuation of the first. At the same time these waves have 
also displayed different ideological orientations, which reflect the change in the social 
and political situation since the onset of the economic crisis of 2008, and thus make 
these two movements interesting case studies for the purpose of comparative 
analysis. While the anti-globalisation movement’s dominant ideology was anarcho-
autonomism (or autonomism for short) as a combination of anarchism and 
autonomism, the movement of the squares has been characterised by the influence 
of left-wing populism (Gerbaudo, forthcoming). As I will endeavour to show this 
ideological shift in social movements maps onto the changing techno-political 
orientations of social movements: the cyber-autonomism of the first wave, and the 
cyber-populism of the second wave of digital activism.    
3.1. An Ideological Periodisation of Digital Activism 
The transformation of digital activism in the last decades can be viewed 
schematically as a move from the margins to the centre, of the political arena, from a 
countercultural politics of resistance to a counterhegemonic politics of popular 
mobilisation. According to this interpretation, while an early form of digital activism 
conceived of the Internet as a separate countercultural space, the second wave of 
digital activism has approached the Internet as part of a political mainstream to be 
occupied by protestors (Gerbaudo 2015). Thus, the first views position the Internet as 
a sort of sanctuary space, in which activists can find solace from the oppressive 
character of society. Conversely the second view considers the Internet as a centre-
piece of contemporary society, one which manifests its contradiction, but also one 
where activists can hope to develop a process of mass mobilisation, capable of 
attracting not only highly politicised people, but a significant section of the general 
population.  
My understanding of the evolution of digital activism and of the presence of two 
distinct waves comes close to the view of Karatzogianni, a media scholar who has 
been working on digital activism since the early 2000s. Karatzogianni proposes the 
existence of 4 waves of digital activism (2015). The first one from 1994 to 2001 
coincides with the early phase of the anti-globalisation movement, from the Zapatista 
uprising in Mexico in 1994, to the protests in Genoa 2001, which were violently 
crushed by police. The second phase from 2001 to 2007 comprises the second 
phase of the anti-globalisation movement, and its rise to prominence worldview. The 
third phase which she describes as the “spread of digital activism”, refers to the 
migration of digital activism to BRICS and other countries beyond Europe and the US 
where digital activism had first developed. The fourth phase finally is when digital 
activism invades mainstream politics, with the rise of phenomena as Wikileaks, the 
Arab Spring uprisings, and the Snowden affair, making digital activism, no longer a 
marginal phenomenon but one that is at the very centre of political conflicts.    
tripleC 15(2): 477-489, 2017 485 
 
CC-BY-NC-ND: Creative Commons License, 2017. 
Rather than encompassing four phases, as proposed by Karatzogianni, my analysis 
is more simplified and focuses on two main waves. Furthermore, it explains the 
transformation as resulting from changes in ideology, which in turn reflect changes in 
the social and political situation and connected shifts in opinions and attitudes. 
Focusing on ideology does not mean to deny the role played by technological factors, 
and in particular the shift from web 1.0 of static websites to web 2.0 of social network 
sites. Rather it suggests that technological impact cannot be understood merely from 
an instrumental perspective, but needs to encompass an understanding of the 
cultural change that is facilitated and influenced by technology, yet not reducible to 
technology alone. We shall now see how this approach can be applied to the two 
different phases that have been identified for the present analysis: the anti-
globalisation movement and the movement of the squares.     
The anti-globalisation movement developed around the turn of the millennium and 
was manifested in a series of large-scale protests against global economic 
institutions such as the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation and the Group of 
Eight (G8) meetings. It was a multi-faceted movement that encompassed very 
different ideological streams including trade unions, Trotskyist groups, 
environmentalists, third world development NGOs, and religious organisations. 
However, at its core this movement and especially its younger section was deeply 
informed by the ideology of autonomism or anarcho-autonomism, an hybrid ideology 
drawing inspiration from post-68 anarchist and Marxist autonomist movement, and 
marked by a strong anti-authoritarian and anti-statist spirit. This ideology centred on 
the project of a politics of autonomy, away from the state and the market and 
attempting to construct a self-governed space of “the common”. The movement of 
the squares has instead turned towards leftwing populism, or more specifically to a 
peculiar brand of populism which I describe as citizenism, that is a populism of the 
citizen, rather than a populism of the people. This ideology centres on a bottom-up 
recuperation and reclamation of democracy and political institutions by ordinary 
citizens, starting on their gathering in public spaces and on social media. It yearns for 
the construction of a radical democracy that may allow a more authentic participation 
than the one offered by corrupt liberal-democratic institutions.     
As we shall see, this opposition between anarcho-autonomism and populism maps 
onto the opposition between cyber-autonomism and cyber-populism, as the dominant 
techno-political orientations of the first and second wave of digital activism.  The way 
in which activists have conceived of and utilised the Internet reflects their general 
worldview, their attitude towards the state, towards politics and towards the general 
population and its prevalent opinions and attitudes. 
3.2. Anti-Globalisation and Cyber-Autonomism  
Let’s begin from the anti-globalisation movement and its digital activism. Anti-
globalisation activists pursued what could be described as a “cyber-autonomist” 
strategy that saw the Internet as a space to construct islands of resistance outside of 
the control of state and capital. As the name suggests this communication logic 
revolved around the idea of creating autonomous spaces of communication on the 
Internet, away from a society controlled by capital and the state. As I have proposed 
in my previous work about this issue (2014) activists were convinced that setting up 
an autonomous communicative infrastructure was a fundamental condition for any 
genuine alternative communication (2014). Building on the tradition of alternative 
media in the 60s, 70s, and 80s, in the context of the underground press, fanzine 
cultures and pirate radios, tech activists hoped to use the Internet to break the 
monopoly of corporate news media responsible for channelling neoliberal 
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propaganda and shutting down all alternative points of view. This vision lay at the 
foundation of an array of alternative media initiatives pursued between the late 90s 
and early 2000s (Pickard 2006; Juris 2008).   
The most visible manifestation of this strategy was Indymedia, the first global 
alternative news initiative with tens of editorial nodes all over the world. At the height 
of counter-summit protests, Indymedia became the unofficial yet semi-official voice of 
the anti-globalisation movement and it also constituted a fundamental organisational 
infrastructure for protestors, with editorial nodes often doubling up as political 
collectives directly involved in organising protest campaigns. Besides Indymedia, 
alternative service providers (ISPs) such as Riseup, Aktivix, Inventati and Autistici 
catered for the internal communication needs of the movement. These groups 
provided secure personal email accounts as well as listservs allowing conversations 
on a number of topics of interest, ranging from protest organisation to squatting and 
permaculture. The imaginary underlying all these activities was one of “Islands in the 
Net”, as expressed in the name of one of the most important activist ISPs in Italy. 
Activists thought of the Internet as something akin to the Temporary Autonomous 
Zones (T.A.Z.) described by Hakim Bey, a space comprising temporary islands in a 
rebel archipelago outside of the control of State and capital. The Internet was thereby 
conceived as an autonomous space, one in which the movement could find a more 
hospitable place to develop its action than the one otherwise offered by a 
consumerist society which was heavily dominated by neoliberal hegemony. This is 
why the techno-political attitude of this phase was also strongly countercultural. It 
saw the Internet as a space where to cultivate an alternative culture, clearly different 
from the majority culture of the time, considered to be irremediably corrupt. The 
movement of the squares projects what can be considered to a great extent as a 
reversal of this position.  
3.3. The Movement of the Squares and Cyber-Populism 
Digital activism in the movement of the squares has instead been characterised by a 
techno-political orientation I have elsewhere (2014) described as “cyber-populism”. 
By this term I define a techno-political orientation that regards the mass web of 
commercial internet services controlled by monopolistic corporations such as 
Facebook, Google and Twitter, as a space that despite its inherent capitalist biases 
needs to be appropriated by activists, and whose mass outreach capabilities need to 
be harnessed and used for their own ends. Rather than creating an alternative 
Internet – a free, self-managed and non-commercial space of communication – 
contemporary tech activists have been more concerned with harnessing the outreach 
capabilities of corporate social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter and 
the digital-popular culture that has emerged on these platforms.   
The examples of this cyber-populist trend abound in the wave of 2011 protests, 
from the Facebook page Kullena Khaled Said in Egypt, to call hundreds of thousands 
to take to the streets, to the work of activists in Spain, Greece, the US, Turkey and 
Brazil, who have used social media as a means for mass mobilisation. Instead of 
trying to create alternative spaces, digital activists within these movements attempted 
to occupy the digital mainstream, appropriating social media as people’s platforms.  
This strategy bears the mark of the majoritarian and popular ambition of the 
Occupy wave, and the fact that these new movements do not content themselves 
with constructing minoritarian spaces of resistance. By using corporate social 
networking platforms, activists invade spaces they know do not belong to them and 
over which they have little control, but they do so in the persuasion that it is 
necessary to take them in order to construct forms of popular mobilisation matching 
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the technical conditions of our era. Instead of aiming to create temporary 
autonomous zones on the Internet as their predecessors in the anti-globalisation 
movement, the new generation of digital activists harboured the desire to break out of 
their life-style ghettoes and reconnect with the 99% of the population they purported 
to fight for. One could thus describe this position as more ‘opportunistic’ in that it tries 
to exploit the political opportunities that unfold within a space which is otherwise 
morally questionable because of its subservience to a market logic. However, this is 
also the element that has allowed these movements to be so successful and to 
achieve a magnitude of mobilisation that evidently surpasses the one achieved by 
anti-globalisation activists.  
4. Conclusion 
In order to understand the transformation of digital activism it is necessary to pay 
attention not just to changes in the materiality of technology, but also to cultural, 
social and political factors that come to shape its understanding and use. This is why 
it is imperative to recuperate the notion of ideology, understood as the system of 
beliefs and values that informs the activist worldview in any given historical period.  
As I have demonstrated in this article the difference between the first wave of 
digital activism around the turn of the millennium, and the second wave in the late 
2000s and 2010s, has been shaped not just by the transformation of digital 
technology and the shift from web 1.0 to the web 2.0 of social network sites but also 
by changes in the ideology of connected social movements, and in particular by the 
shift from anarcho-autonomism of the anti-globalisation movement to the populism of 
the movement of the squares. This ideological turn has translated, in the context of 
digital activism, into a shift from cyber-autonomism to cyber-populism, two techno-
political orientations which carry different assumptions about the role of digital 
technology as both a means and site of struggle. While cyber-autonomism conceives 
of digital technology as an autonomous space separate from the state and capital, 
cyber-populism conceives it as a space of popular gathering and mobilisation.  
This ideological interpretation of digital activism does not entail ignoring the role 
played by technology in shaping collective action. Digital activism certainly reflects 
the nature of technological affordances. For example, the process of massification of 
the web that has paralleled the diffusion of social media goes a long a way towards 
explaining the shift from a minoritarian to a majoritarian logic of mobilisation in digital 
activism. However, technological transformation is not the only determining factor. Its 
effect on the content of activism is filtered through ideological narratives and 
worldviews which contribute in shaping the way activists conceive of the Internet as a 
political battlefield, an aspect that can be captured through the notion of “techno-
political orientations” which has been utilised in this article.  
What is required going forward is thus research that can better account for the 
complex ways in which ideology shapes activist practices and their content. This 
perspective would allow us to overcome some of the shallowness of much 
contemporary analysis of digital activism and better render the way in which this form 
of activism reflects the themes, attitudes, and motivations of connected social 
movements, besides technological factors.  
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